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OPINION OF THE COURT

* Honorable Marvin Katz, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Mauro Maschio appeals from a district court order
granting summary judgment against him in an action he filed under
the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act ("ADDCA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§1221-25.

Because we conclude that the defendant, Prestige

Motors, Inc., is not a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the
ADDCA, we will affirm.
I.
Mercedes-Benz of North America is an affiliate of
Daimler-Benz, a German manufacturer of luxury automobiles.
Defendant Prestige Motors, Inc. is an authorized dealer of
Mercedes-Benz vehicles.

Maschio is the principal owner of Euro-

Trade, U.S.A., Ltd., a corporation licensed to sell automobiles.
Maschio and Euro-Trade regularly purchased scarce
"high-end" automobiles from authorized dealers, including several
Mercedes-Benz dealers.

They would then resell them at a profit

to customers desiring exotic vehicles not generally available in
dealers' showrooms.

During 1989 and 1990, Maschio and Euro-Trade

attempted to purchase sixteen new vehicles from Prestige at
retail, intending to resell them to the general public.

There

was no formal franchise agreement between Prestige and EuroTrade.

Instead, Prestige accepted orders on the same purchase

order form it used when dealing with typical retail buyers.
Prestige honored six of these contracts, but refused to deliver

the remaining ten vehicles, allegedly because of pressure exerted
on it by Mercedes Benz of North America to refrain from selling
automobiles to Maschio.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Prestige on the ADDCA claim, and after determining that
complete diversity was lacking, dismissed the pendent
state law causes of action.

It held that the purchase

orders used in the series of vehicle purchases did not
constitute a franchise agreement within the meaning of
the ADDCA, a necessary element of any such case.
II.
The ADDCA is a remedial statute enacted to redress the
economic imbalance and unequal bargaining power between large
automobile manufacturers and local dealerships, protecting
dealers from unfair termination and other retaliatory and
coercive practices.

See, e.g., Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,

433 F.2d 708, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1970).

It is, essentially, a

supplement to the national antitrust laws, passed to counterbalance the economic leverage a manufacturer has over its
ostensibly independent dealers, and its "control over [its]
product in what amounts to quasi-integration to the retail level
of distribution."

H.R. Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3,

reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N 4596, 4596, 4598.

There are four

elements of an ADDCA cause of action: (1) the plaintiff must be
an automobile dealer; (2) the defendant must be an "automobile
manufacturer" engaged in commerce; (3) there must be a
manufacturer-dealer relationship embodied in a written franchise

agreement; and (4) the plaintiff must have been injured by the
defendant's failure to act in good faith.

15 U.S.C. § 1222;

Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 441 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Although the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Prestige, concluding that the sixteen purchase orders
did not constitute a franchise agreement, we will assume, without
deciding, that there was a valid franchise agreement.1

We will

further assume, without deciding both, that Euro-Trade was a
dealer within the meaning of the Act, and that Prestige
terminated its "franchise" in other than good faith.

We will

instead simply analyze the narrow question of whether Prestige
was a manufacturer under the ADDCA, which we conclude determines
the outcome of Maschio's appeal.
It is axiomatic that our inquiry begins with the
language of the statute.

28 U.S.C. § 1221 defines the term

"automobile manufacturer" as
any person, partnership, corporation,
association, or other form of business
enterprise engaged in the manufacturing or
assembling of passenger cars, trucks, or
station wagons, including any person,
partnership, or corporation which acts for
and is under the control of such manufacturer
or assembler in connection with the
distribution of said automotive vehicles.

1"An appellate court may affirm a correct decision by a
lower court on grounds different than those used by the lower
court in reaching its decision." Erie Telecommunications, Inc.
v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing
cases).

Prestige, of course, does not manufacture or assemble
automobiles.

To be liable as a manufacturer, then, Prestige must

be found to be both "acting for" and "under the control of"
Mercedes-Benz.
Only three courts of appeals have had occasion to
interpret § 1221(a).

The first considered "the 'control'

requirement [to be] satisfied by showing corporate ownership and
confluence of interest."

Colonial Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

592 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1979).

In the other two, the

issue was resolved by reference to agency law.

Stansifer v.

Chrysler Motors Corp., 487 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 1973);
Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 441
(1st Cir. 1966).
These cases usually arise, however, in the context of
distributors or importers that stand between the dealer and the
physical manufacturer.

In those circumstances, courts will be

justifiably concerned that physical manufacturers might attempt
to avoid the ADDCA's requirements by placing a strawman between
themselves and their dealers, thus insulating themselves from the
duty to act in good faith.

In Rohlsen, for example, the court

stated that "the inclusion of certain distributors in section
1221(a) was designed only to prevent a manufacturer from
circumventing its responsibilities under the act by transacting
business with its dealers through alter egos."
That context is not present here.

360 F.2d at 437.

Mercedes-Benz of

North America never agreed to accept Euro-Trade as a dealer.
did Mercedes-Benz employ Prestige as an alter ego to impose

Nor

onerous terms on Euro-Trade without running afoul of the ADDCA;
each operated independently.

At most, Mercedes-Benz pressured

Prestige to cease doing business with Euro-Trade because it
objected to Euro-Trade's business.

Such a desire not to deal

does not implicate the same sort of anticompetitive concerns that
apparently motivated the drafters of the ADDCA, nor is it
indicative of any motive on the part of the physical manufacturer
to oppress the local "dealer" -- in this case Euro-Trade -- with
whom the manufacturer never intended to deal at all.
III.
In sum, we decline to hold that Prestige became a
"manufacturer" the moment it sold automobiles to Euro-Trade.

Nor

do we conclude it was under a manufacturer's "control ... in
connection with the distribution ..." of the automobiles.
Instead, we hold that non-physical manufacturer status is limited
to those situations in which the physical manufacturer has the
potential to control an intermediary that acts for the
manufacturer to avoid its duty to treat its dealers with good
faith, thereby subverting the ADDCA.

For this reason, we will

affirm the judgment of the district court.

